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Methodological	approaches	to	metaphors	in	language	
From	linguistic	to	conceptual	metaphors	
Alice	Deignan	
INTRODUCTION	
From	the	earliest	writing	on	Conceptual	Metaphor	Theory	(CMT,	see	Chapter	2,	
this	volume)	to	the	present,	linguistic	metaphors	have	been	the	main	type	of	
evidence	provided	in	support	of	the	existence	of	conceptual	metaphors.	For	
instance,	the	classic	work	by	Lakoff	and	Johnson	(1980)	begins	with	a	discussion	
of	the	well-known	ARGUMENT	IS	WAR	mapping.	Lakoff	and	Johnson	write	that	‘this	
metaphor	is	reflected	in	our	everyday	language	by	a	wide	variety	of	expressions’	
(p.	4)	among	which	they	list	‘your	claims	are	indefensible…	He	attacked	every	
weak	point	in	my	argument…	His	criticisms	were	right	on	target’	(ibid).	In	1993,	
by	which	time	CMT	had	become	the	established	paradigm	in	metaphor	studies,	
Lakoff	published	a	book	chapter	setting	out	his	position	on	metaphor	in	thought	
and	language.	He	cited	five	types	of	evidence	for	the	existence	of	conceptual	
metaphors.	Of	the	three	that	he	describes	as	‘the	most	robust’	(1993:	205),	two	
are	linguistic:	‘Generalizations	governing	polysemy’	and	‘Generalizations	
governing	novel	metaphorical	language’	(ibid).	He	goes	on	to	cite	many	lists	of	
linguistic	metaphors	as	evidence	for	the	conceptual	metaphors	believed	to	
underlie	and	motivate	them.	To	date,	numerous	other	publications	in	this	
tradition	have	cited	lists	of	linguistic	metaphors	as	evidence	for	conceptual	
metaphors.	In	2014,	for	instance,	Rojas-Sosa	proposed	twelve	conceptual	
metaphors	for	love	based	on	Spanish	language	data.	These	included	THE	OBJECT	OF	
DESIRE	IS	A	FIELD,	for	which	the	evidence	cited	is	the	linguistic	metaphors	in	the	
expression	‘Un	terreno	fértil	donde	dejar	huellas’	translated	by	the	author	as	‘[I	
am	looking	for]	a	fertile	terrain	where	I	can	leave	footprints’	(2014:	205).	
	
In	many	studies	within	the	discourse	tradition,	proposing	conceptual	metaphors	
is	part	of	a	larger	set	of	claims.	One	tenet	of	CMT	is	that	metaphors	are	
ideological,	and	there	is	a	rich	strand	of	literature	in	which	the	analysis	of	
linguistic	metaphors	to	identify	conceptual	metaphors	is	taken	a	step	further,	to	
identify	and	analyse	ideological	positions.	The	conceptual	metaphors	
constructed	through	the	analysis	of	linguistic	metaphor	are	examined	for	
evaluative	stance	and	entailments,	and	the	ideology	apparently	standing	behind	
the	text	is	then	described.	An	important	early	example	of	this	is	Lakoff’s	
discussion	of	the	metaphors	and	metonymies	used	to	talk	about	the	1990	war	in	
the	Gulf	(1991).	Lakoff	analysed	linguistic	metaphors	to	construct	conceptual	
metaphors	through	which	domains	such	as	SPORT,	FAIRY	TALES	and	BUSINESS	were	
mapped	onto	war,	and,	he	claimed,	used	to	justify	the	1990	war	and	to	play	down	
the	resulting	casualties	and	suffering.	
	
Despite	the	number	of	studies	using	this	methodology,	relatively	few	writers	
have	raised	questions	about	the	apparently	straightforward—but	very	
subjective—analytical	process	of	moving	from	the	linguistic	to	the	conceptual.	
The	purpose	of	this	chapter	is	to	discuss	this	methodological	issue.	I	begin	by	
considering	how	linguistic	data	are	selected	for	analysis.	I	then	describe	Steen’s	
(1999)	five-step	method,	which	is	the	most	well-known	procedure	for	working	
from	linguistic	to	conceptual	metaphors,	and	discuss	some	difficulties	with	it.	I	
then	explore	ways	in	which	detailed	analysis	of	linguistic	data	using	corpora	can	
help	with	these	difficulties.	
METHODOLOGY	
The	data	used	to	identify	linguistic	metaphors	
The	first	step	in	considering	methodology	is	a	critical	look	at	data.	The	linguistic	
examples	cited	in	the	classic	CMT	literature	were	for	the	most	part	generated	
intuitively,	either	by	the	researchers	themselves	or	by	their	students.	They	are	
initially	convincing,	but	as	far	back	as	1999,	Steen	pointed	out	that	they	‘serve	
the	purpose	of	demonstration;	they	have	not	been	systematically	and	
exhaustively	collected	from	large	stretches	of	discourse	but	they	have	been	
selected	for	their	persuasive	power’	(1999:	57).			
	
Partly	in	reaction	to	this	perceived	problem,	a	number	of	applied	linguists	have	
examined	metaphors	in	naturally-occurring	language	data.	These	data	are	of	two	
broad	types:	corpus	data	and	discourse	data	(Deignan,	2015a).	Examinations	of	
corpus	data	usually	seek	to	uncover	general	patterns	in	the	meaning,	semantic	
domains	and	form	of	linguistic	metaphors,	that	is,	they	take	a	language	
perspective	to	finding	and	testing	conceptual	metaphors.		Corpus	data	are	
usually	examined	via	concordances,	that	is,	multiple	very	short	extracts	from	
different	texts.	For	instance,	Deignan	(2005)	has	conducted	a	number	of	corpus	
studies	exploring	how	words	from	everyday	source	domains	such	as	PLANTS,	THE	
BODY	and	TEMPERATURE	are	used	with	figurative	meaning.	Stefanowitsch	(2006)	
used	corpus	data	to	investigate	metaphors	of	emotion.	He	started	from	
concordances	of	the	target	domain	words	‘anger’,	‘fear’,	‘joy’,	‘sadness’	and	
‘disgust’	and	searched	for	metaphorical	uses	of	any	other	words	nearby,	as	
opposed	to	Deignan’s	procedure	of	starting	with	source	domain	words	and	
searching	for	any	metaphorical	uses.	
	
Examinations	of	discourse	data	tend	to	focus	on	how	people	use	metaphors	to	
achieve	their	communicative	goals	and	negotiate	meaning;	that	is,	they	take	a	
speaker	perspective.	Discourse	data	are	usually	analysed	as	single	extended	
stretches,	in	contrast	with	the	analysis	of	corpus	data.	Discourse	approaches	can	
thus	allow	for	researchers	to	see	how	metaphorical	meaning	is	built	up	over	an	
interaction,	and	researchers	often	bring	to	the	analysis	their	knowledge	about	
context	and	the	history	of	the	speakers	and	writers.	The	resulting	analysis	of	
linguistic	metaphors	is	thus	more	richly	grounded,	but	researchers	are	less	likely	
to	attempt	language-wide	generalisations.	Researchers	working	in	this	tradition	
include	Cameron	and	her	colleagues	(e.g.,	Cameron	et	al.,	2009;	Cameron	et	al.,	
2014).	One	of	Cameron’s	early	studies	was	a	detailed	analysis	of	the	metaphors	
used	by	children	and	teachers	in	a	British	primary	school	(2003).	She	analysed	
around	27,000	words	of	spoken	data,	from	eight	discourse	events.	She	identified	
linguistic	metaphors	and	traced	their	development	through	the	discourse	events.	
On	the	basis	of	her	analysis,	Cameron	constructs	some	underlying	
generalizations,	which	she	cautiously	suggests	could	be	conceptual	metaphors.	
This	process	enabled	her	to	hypothesize	not	only	about	the	ideational	meaning	
(Halliday	and	Matthiessen,	2004)	of	the	metaphors	used	(that	is,	what	they	refer	
to	or	name)	but	also	to	demonstrate	the	important	role	of	metaphor	in	building	
shared	understanding	and	negotiating	interpersonal	tensions	in	the	classroom.	
She	shows	how	metaphorical	expressions	are	frequently	used	in	suggesting	how	
pupils’	work	and	behavior	could	be	improved.	For	example,	a	teacher	gives	
feedback	on	a	task	saying	‘I	saw	the	people	who	used	their	heads’	(2003:	136)	
and	to	an	individual	‘think	before	you	speak,	give	yourself	a	little	time.	You	
should	watch	the	others	to	find	out	all	the	strategies	they	have	for	buying	time’	
(2003:	135).	
	
There	is	some	crossover	between	the	corpus	and	discourse	approaches,	where	
scholars	compile	relatively	small	datasets	examined	using	a	combination	of	
corpus	and	discourse	methods.	This	hybrid	approach	is	often	used	in	the	analysis	
of	the	metaphors	of	specific	genres	and	registers,	for	instance	in	the	studies	
described	by	Deignan,	Littlemore	and	Semino	(2013).	
	
Having	collected	a	linguistic	dataset,	the	analyst	normally	begins	by	identifying	
linguistic	metaphors.	This	process	has	been	the	topic	of	much	debate	in	the	
metaphor	literature	in	the	last	ten	years	(for	example,	Steen,	2008;	Steen	et	al,	
2010).	This	is	discussed	elsewhere	in	this	volume	by	Steen	(chapter	6),	so	it	will	
not	be	dealt	with	in	this	chapter.	The	following	section	looks	at	the	next	step:	the	
move	from	the	linguistic	metaphors	that	have	been	identified	to	constructing	
conceptual	metaphors.		
Steen’s	Five-Step	method	
Steen	was	the	first	writer	in	the	cognitive	and	applied	linguistics	tradition	to	
tackle	the	difficult	question	of	demonstrating	rigorously	the	analytical	move	
from	linguistic	to	conceptual	metaphor.	He	described	the	challenge	as	‘to	
explicate	the	assumptions	that	lead	linguists	to	arrive	at	[...]	conceptual	
mappings	in	departing	from	metaphorical	expressions	in	discourse’	(1999:	58).	
In	1999,	he	published	the	first	version	of	his	five-step	method,	with	the	aim,	as	
he	described	it	later,	of	forging	‘a	connection	between	the	linguistic	forms	of	
metaphor	in	text	and	talk,	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	conceptual	structures	of	
metaphor	as	assumed	in	cognitive	linguistics	in	the	form	of	conceptual	
metaphors	such	as	ARGUMENT	IS	WAR	on	the	other’	(2011:	93).	His	five	steps	are:	
	
1.! Metaphor	focus	identification;	
2.! Metaphorical	idea	identification;	
3.! Non-literal	comparison	identification;	
4.! Non-literal	analogy	identification;	
5.! Non-literal	mapping	identification.	(1999:	73)	
	
The	first	step,	identifying	linguistic	metaphor,	involves	a	choice	of	several	
methods	(Steen,	this	volume,	chapter	6).	In	general	terms,	these	methods	require	
the	identification	of	the	contextual	meaning	of	each	word,	and	then	establishing	
whether	or	not	there	is	another	meaning	of	that	word	that	could	be	considered	
to	be	its	literal	counterpart.	
	
For	Step	2,	Steen	uses	propositional	analysis,	a	technique	used	in	discourse	
psychology,	to	capture	the	structure	of	concepts.	Semino,	Heywood	and	Short	
write	of	this	that:	‘what	is	involved	is	no	longer	words	but	the	concepts	[…]	
activated	by	the	words	of	the	original	expression’	(2004:	1275).	For	the	purposes	
of	metaphor	study,	Steen	supplements	standard	propositional	analysis	by	
indicating	whether	words	evoke	the	source	domain	(s)	or	target	domain	(t).	For	
instance,	Steen	gives	the	propositional	analysis	for	the	sentence	‘Lakoff	attacked	
Glucksberg’	as:	
	
P1	(ATTACKs	LAKOFFt	GLUCKSBERGt)	(2011:	94).	
	
P1	signals	that	this	is	Proposition	1,	while	s	and	t	stand	for	source	and	target	
domain:	‘Lakoff’	and	‘Glucksberg’	evoke	the	target	domain,	while	‘attack’	evokes	
a	source	domain.	The	propositional	analysis	makes	no	claims	about	processing	
or	mental	mappings;	it	is	purely	an	attempt	to	state	as	logically	and	simply	as	
possible	how	concepts	relate	to	each	other	in	a	sentence.	Steen	writes	that	this	
step	‘lays	bare	how	metaphors	can	differ	from	each	other	with	respect	to	
conceptual	structure’	(1999:	64).	
	
Step	2	produces	input	for	Step	3.	For	metaphorical	sentences,	Step	2	will	have	
produced	a	propositional	analysis	with	elements	from	incongruous	domains,	a	
problem	which	Step	3	tackles.	In	Step	3,	the	proposition	is	rewritten	as	two	
incomplete	propositions,	one	for	the	source	domain,	one	for	the	target	domain.	
For	‘Lakoff	attacked	Glucksberg’,	Step	3	produces:	
	
SIM	{F,	x,	y͒ 	
[F	(LAKOFF,	GLUCKSBERG)]t		
[ATTACK	(x,	y)]s}	
	
The	notation	indicates	a	relationship	of	similarity	shown	by	SIM	in	line	1,	
between	the	two	propositions	in	lines	2	and	3.	F	indicates	an	activity	that	is	not	
explicitly	denoted,	and	x	and	y	indicate	entities	that	are	not	explicitly	denoted.	
These	gaps	are	implicit	in	the	metaphor.	Line	2	expresses	the	entities	and	
activities	in	the	target	domain;	the	unspecified	target	domain	activity	being	
signaled	by	F.	Line	3	expresses	the	entities	and	activities	in	the	source	domain,	
the	unspecified	source	domain	entities	being	signaled	by	x	and	y.	
	
Step	4	produces	an	analogy	from	this	comparison,	filling	in	terms	that	are	
implicit	in	the	previous	steps:	F,	x,	and	y.	For	‘Lakoff	attacked	Glucksberg’,	the	
analogy	is	filled	out	as	follows:	
	
SIM	
[CRITICIZE	(LAKOFF,	GLUCKSBERG)]t		
[ATTACK	(ATTACKER,	ATTACKED)]s}	(ibid)	
	
In	Step	5,	the	source-target	domain	mapping	is	constructed,	which,	in	terms	of	
CMT,	generates	a	conceptual	metaphor.	Steen	summarizes	the	aim	of	Step	5	in	
the	early	version	of	the	five-step	method	as	follows:	‘to	capture	the	full	cross-
domain	mapping	that	might	be	related	to	the	local	analogy	derived	in	step	4,	so	
that	“Lakoff	attacked	Glucksberg”	could	be	connected	in	some	controllable	
fashion	to	ARGUMENT	IS	WAR’	(2011:	103).	Step	5	is	thus	the	fleshing	out	and	
extending	of	the	metaphor;	it	‘takes	each	of	the	correspondences	projected	by	
the	analogy	of	Step	4	and	lines	them	up	as	a	list	of	entailments’	(Steen,	2011:	96).			
	
Table	1	shows	Steen’s	full	analysis	of	‘Lakoff	attacked	Glucksberg’.	The	
descriptions	of	the	steps	in	column	1	are	worded	slightly	differently	from	the	
1999	descriptions	cited	above,	but	the	essentials	are	unchanged.	
	
Table	1	Using	the	five	steps	to	analyse	war	metaphors,	from	Steen	(2011:	94)	
	
Steps	 Analysis	
	 	
Text	 Lakoff	attached	Glucksberg	
1.	Identification	of	metaphor-related	
words	
Attacked	
2.	Identification	of	metaphor-related	
propositions	
P1	(ATTACKs	LAKOFFt	GLUCKSBERGt)	
3.	Identification	of	open	metaphorical	
comparison	
SIM{F,	x,	y	
[F	(LAKOFF,	GLUCKSBERG)]t	
[ATTACK	(x,	y)]s}	
4.	Identification	of	analogical	structure	 SIM	
[CRITICIZE	(LAKOFF,	GLUCKSBERG)t	
[ATTACK	(ATTACKER,	ATTACKED)]s}	
5.	Identification	of	cross-domain	
mapping	
TARGET	<	SOURCE	DOMAIN	
CRITICIZE	<ATTACK	
LAKOFF	<	ATTACKER	
GLUCKSBERG	<	ATTACKED	
	
Possible	inferences	
	
ARGUMENTS	<	WEAPONS	
	
	
By	2011,	Steen	had	modified	his	view	of	Step	5,	writing,	‘I	now	feel	that	a	more	
interesting	use	of	step	5	would	be	to	see	it	as	representing	the	communicative	
dimension	of	metaphor,	which	would	be	useful	as	input	for	the	ongoing	
construction	of	a	context	model	for	the	discourse	as	a	whole’	(2011:	103).	He	
reframes	the	output	of	step	5	in	terms	of	what	the	speaker	is	doing	with	the	
analogy:	‘the	context	model	might	read	something	like	‘the	sender	is	informing	
the	addressee	that	Lakoff	criticized	Glucksberg	in	order	to	add	this	event	to	a	
developing	account’	‘(2011:	201-104).	In	this	version,	the	five	steps	start	from	
language	in	use,	as	before,	and	also	finish	there,	widening	back	to	context,	
informed	by	the	deeper	analogical	analysis.		
PROBLEMS	WITH	THE	FIVE-STEP	METHOD	
The	five	steps	make	the	structural	and	logical	aspects	of	the	process	of	working	
from	linguistic	to	conceptual	metaphor	very	clear,	but	the	method	in	itself	does	
not	resolve	every	difficulty.	The	major	problem	for	the	analyst	is	that	the	method	
as	set	out	here	still	does	not	provide	an	answer	to	the	problem	of	how	we	can	
formulate	one	particular	conceptual	metaphor	rather	than	another,	based	on	
language	data.	This	leap,	which	takes	place	between	steps	4	and	5,	is	dependent	
on	the	intuitions	of	the	researcher.	The	issue	arises	not	just	when	following	the	
five-step	method,	but	in	all	attempts	to	generalize	from	linguistic	to	conceptual	
metaphors.	Cameron	notes	the	problem	in	her	discussion	of	her	classroom	data.	
She	asks	‘How	far	do	the	analyst’s	expectations	about	the	data	shape	the	
interpretations	of	linguistic	metaphor?’	(2003:	252).	In	her	data,	a	teacher	said	‘I	
think	you	all	deserve	a	medal’.	She	analyzed	‘deserve	a	medal’	as	a	linguistic	
realization	of	an	EFFORTFUL	JOURNEYS	mapping,	but	she	notes	that	‘it	could	also	be	
linked	to	fighting	in	a	war,	competing	in	an	art	show	or	a	dog	show’	(ibid).		
	
Steen	acknowledges	that	the	move	from	a	specific	linguistic	metaphor	to	a	
particular	concept,	and	thence	to	a	particular	mapping,	is	the	least	robust	of	the	
five	steps.	He	writes	that	the	‘last	two	steps	of	the	procedure	form	the	weakest	
parts	of	the	chain	with	step	5	being	the	weakest	of	all’	(1999:	73).	Indeed,	there	
seems	to	be	a	danger	of	circularity:	in	the	example	described	above,	Steen	is	
careful	not	to	start	from	the	assumption	that	there	is	a	mapping	from	ARGUMENT	
to	WAR,	but	it	is	easy	to	imagine	how	an	analyst	could	be	influenced	by	his	or	her	
reading	about	conceptual	metaphors	in	the	literature,	or	their	assumptions	
about	conceptual	metaphors.	If	this	were	to	happen,	the	analysis	would	simply	
demonstrate	the	starting	assumptions	of	the	analyst.	
	
A	few	studies	have	applied	the	five-step	method	in	detail	and	discussed	
difficulties	encountered,	the	problem	described	above	being	the	focus	of	most	
discussion.	Krennmayr	used	the	five	steps	to	analyze	linguistic	metaphors	
including	‘winning	‘in	the	citation		
	
Container	group	Tiphook	yesterday	said	it	was	still	confident	of	winning	
its	joint	643	million	bid	for	Sea	Containers…	(2011:	219).		
	
She	notes	that	the	difficulty	of	deciding	what	conceptual	metaphor	underlies	the	
linguistic	one	is	not	specific	to	this	example	but	is	a	general	problem.	She	decided	
on	the	mapping	SUCCEEDING	IS	WINNING,	but	notes	that	a	more	specific	mapping	
SUCCEEDING	IN	A	BID	IS	WINNING	A	COMPETITION	is	possible.	Her	reason	for	choosing	the	
former	is	that	her	‘primary	interest	in	this	example	lies	in	the	conceptual	
structure	of	winning’	(ibid),	that	is,	it	is	based	on	her	analytical	goals,	not	on	a	
claim	to	have	uncovered	speakers’	conceptual	structures.	Indeed,	she	notes	of	
the	five-step	method	that		‘No	claims	are	being	made	as	to	how	people	process	
semantically	related	expressions.’	(2011:	21).	However,	as	Krennmayr,	and	Steen	
repeatedly	make	reference	to	the	identification	of	conceptual	metaphors,	they	
are	of	necessity	making	claims	at	some	level	about	mental	mappings,	albeit	not	
always	accessed	during	online	production	and	processing.	
	
The	step	from	linguistic	to	conceptual	becomes	even	more	difficult	if	there	is	
only	one,	or	a	very	small	number	of	linguistic	metaphors	from	a	particular	source	
domain.	Semino,	Heywood	and	Short	(2004)	explored	and	critiqued	Steen’s	
model	when	they	applied	it	to	the	analysis	of	conversations	about	cancer,	using	a	
combination	of	the	corpus	and	discourse	approaches	described	above.	They	
reported	relatively	little	difficulty	with	the	first	three	steps	of	the	five-step	
method,	but	more	complications	arose	with	Steps	4	and	5.	They	discuss	the	
linguistic	metaphor	‘galloping	away’,	of	which	there	are	two	citations	in	their	
data,	used	to	talk	about	cancer	spreading	quickly	through	the	body.	Intuitively,	
‘galloping’	seems	to	come	from	the	source	domain	of	horses,	and	Semino,	
Heywood	and	Short’s	search	in	three	contemporary	corpora	found	that	in	over	
80%	of	citations,	it	is	in	fact	associated	with	horses.	These	seem	to	be	grounds	
for	postulating	a	conceptual	metaphor	linking	the	source	domain	of	HORSES	with	
the	target	domain	of	CANCER,	but	there	are	several	possibilities	for	the	exact	
wording,	including	FAST	DEVELOPMENT	OF	CANCER	IS	GALLOPING	AWAY	or	CANCER	IS	A	HORSE.	
With	only	two	citations	of	a	single	linguistic	metaphor	from	the	source	domain	in	
their	data,	there	is	no	real	way	of	establishing	which	of	these	is	closer	to	the	
internal	reality	of	speakers.		
	
Another	issue	that	the	analyst	needs	to	consider	is	that	there	may	be	no	other	
linguistic	metaphors	from	the	source	domains	of	HORSES	or	GALLOPING	that	are	
used	to	talk	about	cancer.	Not	all	metaphors	are	mappings	of	entire	domains,	
with	structural	relationships	between	entities,	actions	and	attributes.	In	1987,	
Lakoff	discussed	the	notion	of	‘one-shot’	metaphors,	which	he	initially	applied	
mainly	to	‘image	metaphors’.	He	exemplified	these	by	literary	images,	including	
Breton’s	line	‘My	wife	whose	waist	is	an	hourglass’	(1987:	220).	Image	
metaphors	are	‘to	be	distinguished	from	very	general	conceptual	metaphors	like	
DEATH	IS	DEPARTURE	in	important	ways:	
	
1.! One-shot	mappings,	as	their	name	implies,	are	not	used	over	and	over	
again;	that	is,	they	are	not	conventionalized.		
2.! They	are	not	used	in	everyday	reasoning.		
3.! There	is	no	system	of	words	and	idiomatic	expressions	in	the	language		
whose	meaning	is	based	on	them.		
4.! They	map	image	structure	instead	of	propositional	structure.		
5.! They	are	not	used	to	understand	the	abstract	in	terms	of	the	concrete.		
6.! They	do	not	have	a	basis	in	experience	and	commonplace	knowledge		
that	determines	what	gets	mapped	onto	what.		(1987:	221).		
	
While	‘galloping	away’	is	clearly	not	an	image	in	quite	the	way	that	‘hourglass’	is,	
some	or	all	of	these	characteristics	might	apply.	Items	1	and	3	can	be	tested	
using	linguistic	data	and	are	therefore	considered	the	most	robust	here.	Within	
Semino,	Heywood	and	Short’s	dataset,	there	is	no	evidence	of	
conventionalization	(item	1)	or	of	other	words	and	idiomatic	expressions	that	
are	semantically	related	(item	3).	However	their	corpus	is	not	a	vast	dataset,	and	
it	is	possible	that	evidence	relating	to	these	items	might	be	found	in	similar	texts	
or	a	general	corpus.	In	considering	Item	1,	I	note	that	the	100	million	word	
British	National	Corpus	contains	16	citations	of	‘galloping	away’,	all	of	which	are	
literal,	and	121	citations	of	‘galloping’,	some	of	which	are	metaphorical,	but	none	
describing	illness;	there	are	a	small	number	of	citations	where	‘galloping’	
describes	illness	in	the	Oxford	English	Corpus,	but	here	it	refers	to	illnesses	
spreading	rapidly	through	a	population	rather	than	in	an	individual’s	body.	This	
suggests,	but	does	not	prove,	that	the	metaphor	is	not	strongly	established.	
Regarding	the	third	characteristic,	the	data	studied	by	Semino,	Heywood	and	
Short	do	not	contain	linguistic	metaphors	from	the	same	semantic	field.	Although	
dependent	on	introspective	data,	we	can	consider	items	4	and	5.	For	item	4,	
‘galloping’	possibly	conveys	an	image.	For	item	5,	it	could	be	argued	that	the	
development	of	cancer	is	concrete,	not	abstract	albeit	something	that	is	not	
visible	in	normal	circumstances.	There	is	thus	a	tentative	case	for	considering	
‘galloping	away’	to	be	a	one-shot	metaphor,	if	not	actually	an	image	metaphor.		
	
This,	however,	does	not	necessarily	mean	that	there	is	no	conceptual	metaphor;	
Steen	argues	(1999:	59)	that	one-shot	metaphors	are	conceptual.	Further,	in	
contrast	with	Lakoff	(ibid),	he	implies	that	the	difference	between	one-shot	
metaphors	and	sets	of	metaphors	that	all	appear	to	be	mapped	from	the	same	
source	domain	onto	the	same	target	domain	is	relatively	unimportant.	He	
proposes	that	if	the	researcher	is	concerned	with	this	difference,	it	should	be	
dealt	with	by	a	sixth	step,	after	the	five-step	procedure	has	been	followed:	
	
If	one	insists	on	regarding	as	conceptual	metaphors	only	those	metaphors	
which	are	systematic	(as	opposed	to	one-shot	metaphors),	which	I	do	not,	
then	a	sixth	step	will	have	to	be	added	to	the	procedure,	saying	that	the	
output	of	the	first	five	steps	is	to	be	compared	over	large	numbers	of	
metaphors	in	order	to	establish	more	or	less	systematic	groups	of	
metaphorical	concepts,	labeling	the	largest	systematic	groups	as	
conceptual	metaphors	(1999:	59).	
	
There	is	thus	some	ambivalence	about	the	conceptual	status	of	one-shot	
metaphors,	and	it	is	not	a	question	easily	resolved	using	linguistic	data.	The	
linguistic	evidence	usually	put	forward	for	the	conceptual	nature	of	mappings	is	
the	range	and	systematicity	of	their	linguistic	realizations,	which	by	definition	
are	not	found	for	one-shot	metaphors.	The	issue,	for	the	example	of	‘galloping’,	is	
whether	we	believe	that	‘the	question	“How	is	cancer	conceptualised	within	this	
metaphor?”	would	be	answered	by	saying	that	cancer	is	conceptualised	as	a	
horse	running	around	in	the	body.’	(Semino,	Heywood	and	Short,	1999:	1283).	If	
it	is	accepted	that	a	one-shot	mapping	from	the	fast	movement	of	a	horse	to	the	
fast	progression	of	cancer	may	be	conceptual	to	some	degree,	there	seems	no	
need	to	generalize	away	from	the	linguistic	metaphor	itself.	To	paraphrase	
‘galloping	away’	as	CANCER	IS	A	HORSE,	for	example,	seems	inelegant,	and	also	would	
generate	predictions	about	language	that	are	not	borne	out.	CANCER	IS	A	HORSE	
would	generate	a	different	set	of	entailments	from	those	generated	if	the	source	
is	considered	to	be	GALLOPING	AWAY,	as	I	show	using	corpus	data	in	the	following	
section.	
	
We	thus	have	two	inter-connected	problems	with	moving	from	an	identified	
linguistic	metaphor	to	a	conceptual	metaphor:	
1.! Is	this	linguistic	metaphor	a	realization	of	a	conceptual	metaphor	at	all?	If	
there	is	only	one	instance	of	the	possible	conceptual	metaphor	in	the	
dataset,	it	is	possible	that	it	is	a	one-shot	mapping.	As	noted,	whether	or	
not	a	one-shot	mapping	is	conceptual	cannot	be	determined	using	
linguistic	data.	
2.! What	domains	are	metaphorically	mapped?	At	what	level	of	specificity	
should	this	be	described?	
	
In	the	next	section,	I	offer	some	suggestions	for	how	corpus	linguistic	data	can	be	
used	to	tackle	these	two	problems.	
USING	CORPUS	EVIDENCE	TO	FORMULATE	CONCEPTUAL	METAPHORS	
In	this	section	I	discuss	my	own	and	others’	work	using	various	synchronic	
corpora	to	explore	metaphor	patterns	in	an	attempt	to	tackle	the	above	
questions.	The	first:	‘Is	this	linguistic	metaphor	a	realization	of	a	conceptual	
metaphor	at	all?’,	clearly,	cannot	be	answered	by	linguistic	data	alone.	Language	
cannot	provide	definitive	proof	of	conceptual	structures	and	processes.	It	can	
however	corroborate	or	contradict	hypotheses.	Where	a	conceptual	metaphor	
has	been	proposed	on	the	basis	of	a	small	number	of	linguistic	metaphors	found	
in	a	limited	number	of	texts,	corroboration	can	be	sought	by	examining	a	larger	
corpus	of	similar	texts.	The	existence	of	more	instances	of	the	same	linguistic	
metaphor	provides	some	support,	but	may	demonstrate	a	one-shot	mapping.	
The	existence	of	other	linguistic	metaphors	apparently	realizing	the	same	source	
and	target	domains	offers	support	for	a	more	widespread	mapping.	
	
Early	studies	that	tackled	this	issue	using	large	datasets	include	work	on	
ARGUMENT	IS	WAR	by	Deignan	(2008)	and	Vereza	(2008).	Deignan	(2008)	examined	
large	random	samples	of	concordance	data	from	the	Bank	of	English	for	‘attack’,	
‘defend’,	‘strategy’	and	other	WAR	lexis	cited	by	Lakoff	and	Johnson	(1980),	and	
Vereza	(2008)	examined	the	metaphoricity	of	collocates	of	‘war’	(2008).	The	
general	finding	from	both	studies	was	that	the	data	are	not	directly	contradictory	
of	the	proposed	conceptual	metaphors	ARGUMENT	IS	WAR.	However,	they	reveal	a	
more	complex	picture:	they	suggest	mappings	at	both	more	general	and	more	
constrained	levels	than	those	proposed	in	the	classic	CMT	works.	For	example,	
WAR	lexis	such	as	‘attack’,	‘defend’	and	‘strategy’	is	used	to	talk	about	a	very	wide	
range	of	topics	besides	argument,	suggesting	that	some--	but	not	all--	WAR	
metaphors	are	often	used	about	a	much	wider	range	of	topics	than	just	
argument;	other	semantic	areas	they	describe	include	planning,	strategy	and	all	
kinds	of	competition	and	sport	(Deignan,	2008).	Ritchie	(2003)	made	a	similar	
observation	about	the	difficulty	of	formulating	the	WAR	conceptual	metaphor.	
	
The	quite	general	reference	of	these	metaphors	contrasts	with	another	lexical	
item	from	the	source	domain	of	WAR,	the	verb	‘fire’,	as	used	with	‘gun’	and	similar	
nouns.	This	verb	is	rarely	used	with	a	metaphorical	meaning,	and	when	it	is,	it	is	
almost	always	in	the	string	‘fire/	fires/fired/firing	a	warning	shot’.	In	the	
metaphorical	use,	the	‘shot’	is	almost	always	singular,	and	is	always	premodified	
by	‘warning’.	The	meaning	of	the	metaphor	is	something	close	to	‘take	an	
aggressive	action	with	the	intention	of	starting	an	argument’.	For	this	linguistic	
metaphor	then,	the	mapping	is	formally	and	semantically	more	specific	and	
constrained	than	the	conceptual	metaphor	ARGUMENT	IS	WAR	would	predict.	
Similarly,	the	metaphorical	meaning	of	‘shoot	down’	is	mostly	confined	to	
arguments,	but	only	within	the	collocation	‘shoot	down	in	flames’.	When	not	
followed	by	‘in	flames’,	‘shoot	down’	is	usually	literal	(Deignan	2008).	This	
restriction	is	similar	to	that	noted	above	for	‘fire	a	warning	shot’,	where	the	
plural	form,	‘warning	shots’,	or	‘fire’	with	a	different	object	or	used	intransitively,	
is	usually	associated	with	a	literal	meaning	(ibid).	In	the	studies	generating	these	
observations,	neither	Deignan	nor	Vereza	attempt	to	reformulate	a	conceptual	
metaphor	from	the	source	domain	of	WAR	/	WEAPONS	/VIOLENCE	using	their	
linguistic	data,	and	their	findings	suggest	that	there	may	be	several	related	
mappings	at	work,	at	different	levels	of	generality.	
	
With	regard	to	Semino,	Heywood	and	Short’s	(2004)	data	from	discussions	of	
cancer,	and	the	possible	existence	of	a	GALLOPING	or	HORSE	mapping,	I	noted	above	
that	‘galloping’	itself	as	a	linguistic	metaphor	does	not	seem	well	established	
with	this	meaning	in	the	two	large	general	corpora	that	I	searched	(the	British	
National	Corpus	and	the	Oxford	English	Corpus).	A	search	of	a	larger	corpus	of	
medical	and	doctor-patient	discourse,	or	a	general	corpus,	could	show	whether	
there	are	other	linguistic	metaphors	that	seem	to	realize	a	possible	conceptual	
metaphor.	The	more	linguistic	metaphors	that	are	found	from	apparently	the	
same	source	domain,	the	evidence	the	analyst	has	corroborating	(but	not,	as	
noted,	proving)	the	conceptual	metaphor	that	he/	she	proposes.	For	instance,	if	
alongside	‘galloping’,	it	is	found	that	‘rider’,	‘race’	and	‘horse’	are	also	used	with	
apparently	related	metaphorical	meanings,	we	would	have	stronger	evidence	for	
the	conceptual	metaphor	CANCER	IS	A	HORSE.	However,	my	searches	of	the	British	
National	Corpus	and	Oxford	English	Corpus	suggest	that	these	and	related	source	
domain	words	are	not	used	metaphorically	with	this	meaning.		
	
A	dictionary	that	was	written	using	corpus	data	can	be	a	short	cut	to	such	corpus	
searches,	but	it	can	only	give	positive	evidence:	that	is,	if	a	dictionary	attests	the	
existence	of	other	metaphors	apparently	realizing	a	conceptual	metaphor,	this	
can	be	seen	as	demonstrating	that	the	linguistic	metaphor	in	question	is	not	one-
shot.	If	the	dictionary	does	not	attest	other	linguistic	metaphors	though,	this	
cannot	be	taken	as	evidence	that	they	do	not	exist.	They	may	not	be	frequent	
enough	to	warrant	their	own	sense	in	a	dictionary	entry.		
	
The	second	question	raised	at	the	end	of	the	previous	section	was:	
				
‘What	domains	are	metaphorically	mapped?	At	what	level	of	specificity	should	
this	be	described?’	
	
This	concerns	the	exact	formulation,	or	wording,	of	a	proposed	conceptual	
metaphor.	This	is	important,	because	even	very	closely	related	words	can	have	
very	different	associations	for	language	users.	As	I	noted	above,	when	analysts	
propose	a	conceptual	metaphor,	they	often	go	on	to	discuss	its	entailments.	A	
small	change	in	the	wording	of	a	mapping	can	result	in	major	changes	to	its	
entailments.	I	illustrate	this	by	examining	citations	of	‘horse’	and	‘galloping’,	as	
examples	of	the	possible	mappings	FAST	DEVELOPMENT	OF	CANCER	IS	A	GALLOPING	HORSE	
or	CANCER	IS	A	HORSE	(Semino,	Heywood	and	Short,	2004).		
	
I	searched	for	‘horse’,	and	‘galloping’	in	the	2.4	billion	word	Oxford	English	
Corpus,	using	the	software	Sketchengine	(Kilgarriff	et	al.,	2004).	I	focused	on	
specific	word	forms	rather	than	all	inflections	because	it	has	been	shown	that	
different	inflections	of	a	word	can	have	different	patterns	of	meaning	and	form	
(Deignan,	2005).	There	were	101,	714	citations	of	‘horse’,	and	2367	citations	of	
‘galloping’	at	the	time	of	my	searches.	I	then	examined	words	that	occurred	
frequently	alongside	the	words	under	study,	i.e.	its	collocates.	Collocates	can	be	
significant	clues	to	meaning	and	context	(Sinclair,	1991),	and	they	can	be	
identified	automatically	using	corpus	software.	There	are	various	ways	of	
calculating	the	significance	of	collocates;	here	‘logdice’,	as	recommended	by	
Sketchengine	(Kilgarriff	et	al.,	2004),	is	used.	The	ten	most	significant	collocates	
of	‘horse’	and	‘galloping’,	ignoring	proper	names,	are	shown	in	Table	2:	
	
Table	2:	Most	significant	collocates	of	‘horse’	and	‘galloping’	
	
	 Horse	 Galloping	
1	 Racing/	race	 Hooves/	hoofs	(sic)	
2	 Riding/	ride/	rode	 Cantering	
3	 Cart	 Horses/	horse	
4	 Rider	 Horsemen	
5	 Trainer	 Horseback	
6	 Carriage	 Bareback	
7	 Saddle	 Trotting	
8	 Pommel	 Gait	
9	 Bolted	 Furlongs	
10	 Dark	 Bipedal	
	
Table	2	suggests	that	‘horse’	collocates	significantly	with	words	associated	with	
humans	riding	them,	for	racing,	or	leisure,	and	with	objects	associated	with	the	
domestication	of	the	horse,	such	as	‘saddle’,	‘pommel’	and	‘carriage’.	‘Cart’,	
‘bolted’	and	‘dark’	owe	their	frequency	largely	to	the	idioms	‘put	the	cart	before	
the	horse’,	‘close	the	barn/	stable	door	after	the	horse	has	bolted’	and	‘dark	
horse’.		
	
The	collocates	of	‘galloping’	are	rather	different.	It	tends	to	collocate	with	words	
associated	with	the	movement	of	horses:	‘cantering’,	‘trotting’	and	‘gait’,	and	the	
technical	‘bipedal’	(of	which	there	are	only	4	citations).	It	also	collocates	with	
words	about	riding,	but	evoking	a	less	domesticated	picture	than	the	collocates	
for	‘horse’	do:	the	‘horsemen’	that	collocate	with	‘galloping’	are	either	the	‘four	
horsemen	of	the	Apocalypse’	or	are	in	citations	such	as:		
	
…framing	the	silhouettes	of	three	Mongolian	horsemen	galloping	across	
the	steppes.		
	
Citations	in	which	‘bareback’	and	‘horseback’	collocate	with	‘galloping’	also	
suggest	exotic	and	dangerous	scenes;	they	include:		
	
…	a	warrior	,	galloping	bareback	with	flying	hair	
…	setting	fire	to	a	petrol	tanker	and	galloping	around	it	on	horseback,	
bottles	in	hand.	
	
In	25	of	the	38	citations	in	which	‘galloping’	collocates	with	‘hooves’	or	‘hoofs’,	it	
is	in	reference	to	their	sound,	for	example:	‘The	next	thing	I	knew,	I	was	woken	
up	by	the	sounds	of	galloping	hooves	and	ripping	canvas.’	As	was	the	case	for	the	
some	of	the	other	collocates,	the	source	texts	tend	to	be	narrative	and	fictional.	
These	Oxford	English	Corpus	collocations	suggest	that	‘horse’	and	‘galloping’,	
although	apparently	from	the	same	source	domain,	are	part	of	different	
schemata	at	the	level	of	detail:	the	former	evokes	riders	and	racing	in	a	
controlled	way,	while	some	citations	of	‘galloping’	evoke	danger	and	lack	of	
control,	and	others	are	from	technical	discussions	of	horses	moving.	(Because	
‘galloping’	is	a	relatively	infrequent	word,	the	words	towards	the	bottom	of	the	
list	represent	fewer	than	10	citations	and	not	too	much	weight	should	be	placed	
on	these	as	collocates.)	The	metaphorical	entailments	of	the	two	scenarios	are	
very	different:	a	metaphorical	entailment	of	CANCER	IS	A	HORSE	might	therefore	
involve	riders	controlling	it,	while	scenarios	from	DEVELOPMENT	OF	CANCER	IS	
GALLOPING	AWAY	might	involve	danger	and	lack	of	control.	
	
Dancygier	and	Sweetser	(2014:	199-	200)	take	a	related	approach,	to	the	
analysis	of	literary	metaphor.	They	consider	Emily	Dickinson’s	19th	century	
poem	‘Over	the	fence’,	which	‘appears	to	be	about	a	small	girl	wishing	she	dared	
to	be	disobedient	and	climb	over	a	fence	to	steal	some	strawberries’	(p.	199).	
They	suggest	the	poem	may	be	a	metaphor	for	more	adult	activities	that	were	
forbidden	or	censored	in	unmarried	females,	such	as	being	sexually	active	and	
having	a	career.	The	writers	do	not	use	corpus	data,	but	in	common	with	my	
arguments	above,	they	speculate	about	associations	between	concepts,	in	
attempting	to	reconstruct	the	metaphorical	mappings	behind	the	language.	
Dickinson	writes	‘Over	the	fence.	I	could	climb	if	I	tried,	I	know’;	Dancygier	and	
Sweetser	write	that	the	mention	of	‘climbing’	suggests	a	career.	They	do	not	offer	
corpus	evidence	for	this,	and	I	am	unable	to	find	any	collocational	evidence	that	
climbing	is	especially	associated	with	progress	in	a	career,	or	was	in	nineteenth	
century	English,	but	this	seems	intuitively	plausible.	The	other	possible	
interpretation,	that	the	poem	refers	to	forbidden	sexual	activity,	is	evoked,	they	
say,	by	the	reference	to	strawberries,	which	may	suggest	the	notion	of	forbidden	
fruit.	
	
In	this	section,	I	have	argued	that	corpus	data	should	be	consulted	when	
attempting	to	hypothesise	about	the	existence	of	a	conceptual	metaphor	from	
linguistic	expressions.	Corpus	citations	can	provide	insights	into	the	
conventionalization,	frequency	and	range	of	metaphorical	uses	from	a	source	
domain.	Although	not	sufficient	as	proof	of	a	conceptual	mapping,	it	can	help	
with	its	formulation,	and	can	demonstrate	what	the	entailments	of	various	
alternative	formulations	may	be.	This	leads	to	the	issue	of	the	level	of	specificity	
required	in	formulating	a	conceptual	mapping,	which	I	now	discuss.	
CONCEPTUAL	MAPPINGS	AT	OTHER	LEVELS	
The	early	works	in	CMT	identified	intuitively	satisfying	mappings	such	as	
ARGUMENT	IS	WAR,	LIFE	IS	A	JOURNEY	and	THEORIES	ARE	BUILDINGS,	but,	as	described	
above,	closer	linguistic	analysis	of	expressions	from	domains	such	as	WAR	
suggests	that	the	boundaries	around	the	mappings	are,	at	very	least,	hazy,	and	
variable	for	different	linguistic	expressions.	Scholars	from	different	traditions	
have	suggested	mappings	that	are	both	more	general	and	more	specific	than	
traditional	conceptual	metaphors.	
	
Grady	(1997)	argues	that	cognitive	mappings	work	at	a	deeper	and	more	general	
level	than	the	kind	of	conceptual	metaphors	described	by	Lakoff	and	Johnson	
(1980).	He	works	within	the	cognitive	tradition,	and	used	Lakoff	and	Johnson’s	
original	linguistic	data,	supplemented	with	other	intuitively	derived	expressions.	
One	of	the	examples	he	works	with	is	the	conceptual	metaphor	THEORIES	ARE	
BUILDINGS	put	forward	by	Lakoff	and	Johnson.	Grady	explored	the	linguistic	
examples	given	by	Lakoff	and	Johnson,	such	as	‘She’s	on	very	solid	ground	with	
her	latest	theoretical	work’.	He	also	discusses	linguistic	metaphors	that	might	
have	been	predicted	by	the	conceptual	metaphor	but	which	do	not	occur,	such	as	
‘This	theory	has	French	windows’,	and	other	linguistic	metaphors	that	are	used	
to	talk	about	theories	but	are	apparently	from	different	source	domains,	such	as	
‘They	tore	the	theory	to	shreds’.	Grady	argues	that	the	data	are	better	explained	
by	the	existence	of	‘something	like	a	compound	metaphor—a	metaphor	
composed	of	separate	and	independently	motivated	metaphorical	
correspondences’	(1997:	273).	In	this	view,	THEORIES	ARE	BUILDINGS	is	not	the	
primary	mapping,	but	a	compound	of	the	correspondences	ORGANIZATION	IS	
PHYSICAL	STRUCTURE	and	PERSISTING	IS	REMAINING	ERECT.	He	notes	that	the	source	and	
target	of	these	primary,	or	basic	metaphors	(both	terms	are	used)	would	not	be	
considered	to	be	‘domains’.	Grady’s	hypothesis	is	regarded	as	both	credible	and	
important	within	cognitive	linguistics,	but	for	an	applied	linguist,	the	problems	
of	arriving	at	primary	metaphors	from	linguistic	data	are	the	same	as,	but	
greater,	than	for	conceptual	metaphors.	
	
In	contrast,	Musolff	(e.g.	2006)	has	proposed	a	more	detailed	unit	of	analysis.	He	
analyzed	corpora	consisting	of	the	texts	of	public	debates	in	English	and	German	
on	the	topic	of	the	European	Union.	He	found	that	a	large	number	of	linguistic	
metaphors	can	be	related	to	the	source	domain	of	LOVE-MARRIAGE	FAMILY,	explained	
at	the	most	basic	level	by	Lakoff’s	A	NATION	STATE	IS	A	PERSON	(p.	24).	He	examined	
the	large	number	of	linguistic	metaphors	that	seem	to	be	realizations	of	these	
source	domains	in	a	good	deal	of	detail,	considering	who	had	produced	them,	
and	what	detailed	meanings	and	evaluative	stance	they	seemed	to	convey.	
Within	this	general	mapping,	Musolff	finds	mini-narrative	structures,	which	he	
terms	scenarios,	in	which		
the	characterization	of	the	participants	in	terms	of	their	roles,	intentions,	
and	states	of	minds,	as	well	as	the	assessment	of	their	actions	in	terms	of	
chances	of	success,	are	in	fact	highly	specified.	(p.	27)	
Different	scenarios	can	be	developed	to	reflect	speakers’	stance	towards	the	
topic.	Britain’s	traditional	euro-scepticism	is	reflected	in	texts	from	British	
publications,	which	tended	to	develop	separation	and	divorce	narratives.		
	
Conceptual	metaphors	are	at	a	mid-level	of	specificity	between	primary	
metaphors	and	scenarios.	In	terms	of	linguistic	evidence,	the	case	is	no	more	
compelling	for	conceptual	metaphors	than	for	the	other	two,	but	they	remain	
apparently	the	most	intuitively	attractive,	and	easily	the	most	frequently	used	
concept	in	the	metaphor	literature.	
	
Another	possibility	for	the	analyst	is	to	recognize	that	many	linguistic	metaphors	
seem	to	fall	into	semantic	groupings	but	without	making	a	strong	commitment	to	
the	existence	of	long-standing	conceptual	mapping.	Cameron	and	Maslen	(2010)	
have	done	this	with	the	notion	of	systematic	metaphors	(see	chapter	7).	
Cameron,	Pelosi	and	Pedroso	de	Moraes	Feltes	(2014)	describe	a	methodology	
for	identifying	systematic	metaphors,	and	identify	some	smaller,	scenario-like	
units.	They	argue	that	very	abstract	generalizations	should	be	avoided;	we	
should	abstract	only	as	far	as	strictly	necessary	from	the	actual	words	used	in	
the	talk.	‘The	operating	principle	at	this	step	is	to	stay	as	close	to	the	language	
used	by	participants	as	possible,	generalizing	a	label	from	the	talk	only	as	far	as	
is	needed	to	include	related	vehicles’	(2014:	29).	They	specifically	distance	
themselves	from	claims	about	a	conceptual	level:	‘The	labels	given	to	groupings	
are	not	intended	to	reflect	assumptions	about	levels	of	cognitive	processing	or	
the	nature	of	mappings.’	(2014:	30).	However	what	they	find	about	general	
metaphors	‘…supports	the	idea	that	large-scale,	generalized	metaphors	can	
emerge	from	human	embodied	experience	and	social	interaction,	and	overlap	
with	‘conceptual	metaphors.’	(2014:	40).	While	Cameron,	Pelosi	and	Pedroso	de	
Moraes	Feltes	are	not	explicitly	aligned	with	Conceptual	Metaphor	Theory,	their	
methodology	constitutes	good	practice	for	researchers	who	are	attempting	to	
identify	conceptual	metaphors.	
CURRENT	RESEARCH	AND	FUTURE	DIRECTIONS	
Current	research	focuses	on	a	number	of	areas.	Researchers	continue	to	debate	
which	tools	and	methods	should	be	used	in	metaphor	identification,	and	how	
they	should	be	used	to	develop	generalizations	about	linguistic	and	conceptual	
metaphor.	For	example,	MacArthur’s	(2015)	writes	of	inconsistencies	and	
problems	with	the	use	of	dictionaries	in	metaphor	identification.	Dorst	and	
Reijniersi	(2015)	and	Deignan	(2015b)	responded,	and	the	debate	raised	once	
more	the	status	of	data,	and	the	danger	of	allowing	the	analysts’	preconceptions	
about	conceptual	metaphors	to	cloud	the	data	analysis.		
	
Research	into	metaphor	is	increasingly	recognizing	that	every	language	
community	is	composed	of	different	speakers,	with	different	experiences	and	
interests,	and	that	we	cannot	assume	a	shared,	static	set	of	conceptual	
structures.	Recent	research	has	considered	different	genres	and	registers,	and	
has	suggested	that	linguistic	metaphors	vary	a	good	deal	across	these	even	
where	the	subject	matter	of	texts	is	closely	related.	This	would	suggest	that	
different	groups	of	people	call	on	different	conceptual	metaphors	for	the	same	
topics,	and	that	we	seem	to	access	different	conceptual	metaphors	when	
speaking	or	writing	at	different	levels	of	formality	or	for	different	audiences.	For	
example,	Deignan,	Littlemore	and	Semino	(2013)	present	a	series	of	studies	of	
the	metaphors	of	different	but	related	genres	and	registers.	They	show	how	
different	groups	of	language	users	have	different	metaphorical	resources	to	
think	and	talk	about	the	same	topics,	and	how	they	can	misunderstand	each	
others’	uses	of	metaphorical	language.	Methodologically,	such	work	requires	
carefully	compiled	datasets,	and,	increasingly,	researchers	are	talking	to	
members	of	the	language	community	that	they	are	studying	rather	than	relying	
on	their	own	interpretation	of	texts.	
	
Extending	the	exploration	of	figurative	language	in	other	directions,	Dancygier	
and	Sweetser	(2014)	discuss	the	crossover	between	creative	and	conventional	
uses,	and	the	nature	of	multimodal	figurative	expression.	They	also	consider	how	
longstanding	metaphorical	mappings,	while	persisting	in	language	over	decades	
or	centuries,	may	mean	very	different	things	to	language	users	in	different	times	
and	places:	‘the	metaphor	GOD	IS	A	FATHER	is	surely	not	the	same	blend	for	modern	
English	speakers	as	it	was	for	ancient	Near	Eastern	cultures	where	a	father	could	
sell	his	children’	(2014:	216).	In	their	discussion	of	metaphor	in	literature	they	
suggest	a	fascinating	reversal	of	the	interpretation	process	usually	suggested.	As	
noted	above,	they	discuss	Dickinson’s	‘Over	the	fence’.	They	note	that	a	mention	
in	the	poem	of	God’s	disapproval	(‘	God	would	certainly	scold’)	would	suggest	to	
the	reader	that	the	target	domain	is	LIFE.	The	reader’s	knowledge	of	the	existing	
mappings	LIFE	IS	A	JOURNEY,	PURPOSES	ARE	DESTINATIONS	and	DIFFICULTIES	ARE	OBSTACLES	
will	then	suggest	metaphorical	interpretations	for	some	of	the	language.	This	is	a	
reversal	of	the	process	usually	described;	here	it	is	suggested	is	that	the	reader’s	
interpretation	will	proceed	from	guessing	about	the	target	domain	through	
knowledge	of	existing	conceptual	metaphors,	to	an	interpretation	of	the	
language:	from	conceptual	to	linguistic	rather	than	the	other	way	round.	
CONCLUSION	
The	notion	of	conceptual	metaphors	is	problematic	for	many	researchers,	and	
has	become	more	so	in	recent	years.	However,	even	for	the	most	sceptical,	there	
remains	a	valuable	insight,	that	generalizations	can	be	detected	from	linguistic	
metaphors	and	that	these	generalizations	seem	able	to	generate	novel	
metaphors,	and	probably	frame	world-views.	These	points	are	important	for	all	
metaphor	researchers	regardless	of	their	level	of	adherence	to	CMT.	While	the	
imaginative	leap	of	CMT	rightly	generated	much	excitement,	for	a	time	
methodological	rigour	lagged	behind	creativity.	The	work	of	Steen	and	his	
colleagues,	among	others,	has	shown	that	methods	need	to	strive	to	be	rigorous	
and	replicable	in	this	area	as	in	other	scientific	work,	while	the	contributions	of	
corpus	and	text	analysts	have	suggested	some	ways	forward.	
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